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NOTES AND COMMENT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF SPOUSE FOR THEFT OF THE OTHER
SPOUSE'S PROPERTY
Introduction
Today in most of the states the legal personality of the wife is
almost as complete as that of her husband. This has not always been
true.' At the common law a husband became entitled to the rents
and profits of his wife's real property, having an interest denomi-
nated a freehold estate jure uxoris; 2 he was entitled to enjoy her
choses in action upon reducing them to possession; s and upon mar-
riage her personal property became his.4 The effects of marriage,
however, did not stop there. A feme covert could not sue or be sued
in her own name.5 She could not make a valid contract with third
persons, 6 and neither she nor her husband had capacity mutually to
contract.7 Neither spouse could sue the other for torts committed
against person or property,8 and neither could be convicted for crimes
against the property of the other.9
I "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage,
or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband. * * * Upon
this principle, of a union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the
legal rights, duties and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the mar-
riage." 1 BL. COMM.* 442; HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE (13th ed. 1924) 353.
2 Finnegan v. Humes, 163 Misc. 840, 298 N. Y. Supp. 50, 53 (1937)
("Under the common law, the husband was entitled to the rents and profits of
his wife's lands during their joint lives, and to the rents and profits of lands
held in entirety; and this was his right as husband") ; DIcEY, LAW AND OPIN-
ION IN ENGLAND (2d, ed. 1914) 372n.; 2 KENT, CoMM. 130.
3 DIcEY, op. cit. supra; KENT, op. cit. supra, at 138; 2 BL. COMM.* 434.
42 BL. COMM.* 433; 2 KENT, op. cit. supra, at 144; TIFFANY, THE LAW OF
PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1909) 92.
5 1 BL. CoarM.* 443; 30 C. 3. 945; ANSON, ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACTS
(8th ed. 1895) 149; EDGAR, LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1936) 68.
GTIFFANY, op. cit. supra, at 117; CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1904) 188.
7 1 BL. COMM.* 443; 2 KENT COMM. 129; 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS 65; 30 C. J. 669.
8 Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644 (1882) ; Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571,
159 N. E. 656 (1927); Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23 (1935);
VERNIER, op. cit. supra, at 353; EDGAR, Op. cit. supra, at 69; TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra, at 73.
9 People v. Rossiter, 173 Misc. 268, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 30 (1940) ; People
ex rel. Troare v. McClelland, 146 Misc. 545, 263 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1933) ; see
People v. Decker, 143 App. Div. 590, 127 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (2d Dep't 1911);
Thomas v. Thomas, 51 Ill. 62 (1869); cf. Lamphier v. State, 70 Ind. 317
(1880) ; State v. Banks, 48 Ind. 197 (1874) ; see Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 69
Mass. 450 (1855); Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106 (1872); State v. Arnold,
182 Minn. 313, 235 N. W. 373 (1931); People ex rel. Carr v. Martin, 261 App.
Div. 865, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 729 (3d Dep't 1941) ; State v. Phillips, 85 Ohio St.
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Under the married women's enabling acts of New York a mar-
ried woman may contract with third persons or with her husband as
though she were single; 10 she may sue or be sued in contract or in
tort in her own name," and in New York, by a recent enactment,
she may sue her husband in tort for personal injuries as well as for
injuries to her property.' 2 Correlatively, the husband may also sue
317, 97 N. E. 976 (1912) ; State v. Parker, 3 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 551 (1882) ;
Golden v. State, 22 Tex. App. 1, 2 S. W. 531 (1886) semble; VERNiR, op. cit.
supra, at 164.
10 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 51: "Powers of married woman: A married
woman has all the rights in respect to property, real or personal, and the
acquisition, use, enjoyment and disposition thereof, and to make contracts in
respect thereto with any person, including her husband, and to carry on any
business, trade or occupation, and to exercise all powers and enjoy all rights in
respect thereto and in respect to her contracts, and be liable on such contracts,
as if she were unmarried; but a husband and wife cannot contract to alter or
dissolve the marriage or to relieve the husband from his liability to support his
wife. All sums that may be recovered in actions or special proceedings by a
married woman to recover damages to her person, estate or character shall be
the separate property of the wife. Judgment for or against a married woman,
may be rendered and enforced, in a court of record, or not of record, as if she
was single. A married woman may confess a judgment specified in section
five hundred and forty of the civil practice act. As amended L. 1941, c. 13,
§ 1, eff. Feb. 17, 1941."
"l N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 51; id. § 57: "Right of action by or against
married woman, and by husband or wife against the other, for torts: A mar-
ried woman has a right of action for an injury to her person, property or
character or for an injury arising out of the marital relation, as if unmarried.
She is liable for her wrongful or tortious acts; her husband is not liable for
such acts unless they were done by his actual coercion or instigation; and such
coercion or instigation shall not be presumed, but must be proved. A married
woman has a right of action. dgainst her husband for his wrongful or tortious
acts resulting to her in any personal injury as defined insectim thirty-seven-a
of the general construction law, or resulting in injury to her property, as if
they were immarried, and she is liable to her husband for her wrongful or
tortious acts resulting in. any such personal injury to her husband or to his
property, as if they were uumarried. Italic portion added by L. 1937, c. 669,
§ 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1937!'
N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 200: "A married woman may be a party in the
same manner as if she were single. Her husband is not a necessary or proper
party solely because of his relationship as such husband."
As to a married woman's property the following sections apply:
N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 50: "Property, real or personal, now owned by a
married woman, or hereafter owned by a woman at the time of her marriage, or
acquired by her as prescribed in this chapter, and the rents, issues, proceeds and
profits thereof, shall continue to be her sole and separate property as if she
were unmarried, and shall not be subject to her husband's control or disposal
nor liable for his debts."
N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 56: "Husband and Wife may convey or transfer
real or personal property directly, the one to the other, without the intervention
of a third person; and may make partition or division of any real property held
by them as tenants in common, joint tenants or by the entireties. If so ex-
pressed in the instrument of partition or division, such instrument bars the
wife's right to dower in such property, and also, if so expressed, the husband's
tenancy by curtesy."
12 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 57.
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the wife.13 Thus it may be seen that the tendency has been to divest
marriage of many of its old attributes and to place both husband and
wife in a position of independence as to their respective legal person-
alities. The question here to be considered is whether or not as the
law stands today in New York, acts by a spouse against the other's
property, which would be criminal if committed against the property
of a third person, are crimes. Such acts at the common law were not
crimes because in contemplation of law husband and wife were one.
But today, in many jurisdictions where the wife is almost completely
emancipated the courts have continued to hold that neither spouse
may be guilty of larceny or embezzlement of the other's property.14
Apparently this result is not logical, for if the spouses' immunity
rested upon the "unity" concept, a destruction of the elements which
constituted the unity should, a fortiori, also destroy the immunity.15
Nevertheless, a "legal", if not logical, reason may be found. The
common law rule as to immunity has rarely, if ever, been expressly
altered by the married women's enabling acts. These statutes are in
derogation of the common law, and hence are to be strictly con-
strued.16 Giving to these statutes a strict construction will result
only in an alteration of the rights of the spouses, but will not give the
state a right which it may protect by criminal proceedings.' 7 This
affords a technical, but certainly not a satisfactory, reason for the re-
fusal of the majority of the states to abandon the old rule of immunity.
It is more than likely that social policy has always been at the bottom
of the immunity although the courts have found it easier to attribute
it to the fiction that husband and wife are one person. On the other
hand if the unity of husband and wife consists of more than the rights
and disabilities which have been split off from the relation by the
'3Ibid.; Bodine, et al. v. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 93, 96 (1873) ("With the
removal of common-law disabilities from married women, corresponding liabili-
ties have necessarily been imposed upon them. They take the civil rights and
privileges conferred, subject to all the incidental and correlative burdens and
obligations, and their rights and obligations are to be determined by the same
rules of law and evidence by which the rights and obligations of the other sex
are determined under like circumstances.").
14 State v. Arnold, 182 Minn. 313, 235 N. W. 373 (1931) (larceny); People
ex rel. Carr v. Martin, 261 App. Div. 865, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 729 (3d Dep't
1941); People ex rel. Troare v. McClelland, 146 Misc. 545, 263 N. Y. Supp.
403 (1933) ; State v. Phillips, 85 Ohio St. 317, 97 N. E. 976 (1912) (larceny) ;
State v. Parker, 3 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 551 (1882) ; Golden v. State, 22 Tex.
App. 1, 2 S. W. 531 (1886) (embezzlement).15 People v. Rossiter, 173 Misc. 268, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 30 (1940) ; Beasley
v. State, 138 Ind. 552, 38 N. E. 35 (1894).
18 Jooss v. Fey, 129 N. Y. 17, 29 N. E. 136 (1891) ; Fitzgerald v. Quann,
109 N. Y. 441, 17 N. E. 354 (1888); Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152 (1883).
Statutes are not to be construed as effecting any change in the common law
beyond their express terms or by necessary implication. Tompkins v. Hunter,
149 N. Y. 117, 43 N. E. 532 (1896); People v. Hall, 80 N. Y. 117 (1880);
Graves El. Co. v. Callanan, 11 App. Div. 301, 42 N. Y. Supp. 930 (3d Dep't
1896) ; State v. Arnold, 182 Minn. 313, 235 N. W. 373 (1931).
17 State v. Arnold, 182 Minn. 313, 235 N. W. 373 (1931).
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married women's acts it is not inconsistent to hold that the unity has
not been destroyed to an extent which will make it incapable of sup-
porting the immunity of a spouse. The "free marriage" of the Romans,
unlike the older form, marriage with manus, did not impair a wife's
antenuptial rights, and whatever she acquired by her own labor, by
inheritance, or otherwise, during marriage she held in her sole right.
But despite this, the spouses could not sue one another for theft.' 8
Thus it appears that the idea of immunity was formulated centuries
before the common law idea of "unity" was developed.
Case Law
(a) The Majority Rule
In an early case, Snyder v. People,9 the Supreme Court of Mich-
igan reversed a conviction for arson of a husband who had burned
his wife's house. Title to the house was in the wife, but it was not
clearly shown on trial whether it was the dwelling of both spouses.
The court apparently held that if the husband lived in the house with
his wife it was his dwelling and, hence not "the dwelling-house of
another" within the meaning of the arson statute, but that it would
not be his dwelling if he were living apart from his wife. This rea-
soning seems to have been the basis for the reversal of the conviction,
but the court also referred to the common law rule that a husband
cannot be guilty of arson in burning his wife's house, and considered
the effects of statutory changes in the rights of married women,
saying:
As regards her individual property, the law has done little more than to
give legal rights and remedies to the wife, where before, by settlement or
contract, she might have established corresponding equitable rights and reme-
dies, and the unity of man and woman in the marriage relation, is no more
broken up by giving her a statutory ownership and control of property, than it
would have been before the statute, by such family settlement as should give
her the like ownership and control. At the common law, the power of inde-
pendent action and judgment was in the husband alone; now it is in her also,
for many purposes; but the authority in her, to own and convey property, and
18 SoHM, INSTITUTE OF ROMAN LAW (3d ed. 1907) 462, et seq.
'19 Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106 (1872). Another case which the writer
has found frequently cited in support of the proposition that a spouse cannot be
guilty of larceny or embezzlement of the other spouse's property is Golden v.
State, 22 Tex. App. 1, 2 S. W. 531 (1886), cited in notes 9 and 14, supra. A
careful examination of this case reveals that its bearing on the point is uncer-
tain. It appears that H. embezzled money from W.'s mother. The Court of
Appeals held that a charge that H. could not be convicted if the money in fact
belonged to W. was not error. On the evidence there could have been no
conviction of H. if the money had belonged to W. because she had apparently
assented to H.'s acts. Also, as the indictment laid the ownership in another, if
the jury found that such other had no property in the money an acquittal would
have been proper.
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to sue and be sued, is no more inconsistent with the marital unity, than the
corresponding authority in him.
2 0
In this opinion appears the view that the unity of husband and wife
does not consist solely of property rights.2 ' Substantially the same
view was taken a few years later by the Supreme Court of Ohio in
State v. Phillips.22 In this case the court held that the married
women's enabling acts should not be construed to extend beyond their
necessary intendment, and that the common law rules prohibiting civil
actions between spouses and giving a spouse immunity from criminal
prosecution for injuries to the other's property should be abrogated
only by clearly expressed legislation. The court went beyond this,
however, and assigned social interest in the family relation as an
additional reason for reversing the conviction of the defendant wife
for larceny. In this connection the court said:
Moreover, the unity of husband and wife as recognized in the common
law, is founded not merely on a community of goods, but upon the recognized
obligation of both to the family and to society. The unit of society is not the
individual but the family; and whatever tends to undermine the family, by the
irrepealable laws of nature will crumble and destroy the foundations of society
and the state. So that the peace and sanctity of the home and family are the
ultimate reason for the common-law rule. We do not think that we can safely
hold by mere inference that the Legislature has taken such a long step in the
direction of destructive legislation.23
In another leading case 2 4 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held
that a wife could not be guilty of larceny of her husband's property.
The court took the view that although the rule of strict construction
of criminal statutes in favor of the accused no longer prevails in Min-
nesota, the "fair import" rule did not justify the creation of a crime
by implication, from the married woman's act.25  The court quoted
2026 Mich. 106, 108 (1872).
21 Cf. People v. Rossiter, 173 Misc. 268, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 30 (1940) ; see
30 MIcH. L. REv. 622.
2285 Ohio St. 317, 97 N. E. 976 (19,12).
23 97 N. E. 976, 977. Apparently the court was of the opinion that to
allow actions between spouses as well as to allow their prosecution under the
stated circumstances would be equally destructive of the family. The writer
has not encountered any evidence which would tend to show that the family is
less stable in New York than in other states where actions between spouses are
not permitted for both tort and contract.
24 State v. Arnold, 182 Minn. 313, 235 N. W. 373 (1931) ; see (1932) 30
MIcH. L. REv. 30; (1931) 15 MixN. L. Ray. 589.
25235 N. E. 373, 376 ("To create crimes was not the purpose of these
acts. Their purpose was to protect and extend the rights of married women,
not to subject them to penalties not theretofore existing. Crimes were farthest
from the thoughts of the advocates of these acts, as well as from those of the
legislators who enacted them. Their advocates were doubtless ardent feminists
who sought equality of property righti before the law, and an accusation that
they were trying to break up the marital unity in any other respect and make it
a mere legalized cohabitation would have been resented by them, as well as by
the Legislatures which yielded to their persuasion. Marriage was looked upon,
[ VOL. 16
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from the Phillips and Snyder cases and in expressing a like view as
to the nature of the marriage unity said:
The common-law rule that a wife could not commit larceny of her hus-
band's property rested, not alone upon the doctrine that her property and
possessions were his, but upon the unity of husband and wife which marriage
created; the community of interest in the social institution of marriage. The
technical ownership of his wife's personal property by the husband might have
been sufficient to protect him if he were accused of its theft, but certainly his
ownership and control of her personal property was not alone sufficient to
justify the doctrine as to her immunity. Something more was needed to pro-
tect her, and that was the unity of the social relationship of marriage, giving
the word social its broadest meaning.26
The court also said that criminal remedies are not to be used
as private remedies, and seems to have embraced the opinion that the
spouses' rights were to be limited to civil actions for property torts.
This, of course, is a point which comes very close to the heart of the
problem. The enabling acts purport to give rights to the wife, and
consequently to impose corresponding obligations upon her. They do
not purport to give new rights to the state. Loosely, one may say
that a spouse seeks to prosecute the other for larceny. It is obvious,
as an elementary proposition, that this is not correct. The state
prosecutes an offender for criminal acts, although often the person
from whom the goods were stolen is the "star" witness, or is the in-
stigator of the proceedings. A crime is an injury to the state, not,
in a legal sense, to the person or persons who are directly affected by
it. It is an act "against the peace and dignity of the state". The
three cases discussed above have not emphasized this point, but all
have made it unmistakably clear that it would have been an easy
matter for the legislatures involved to render spouses liable in the
premises by the simple expedient of passing a law which would leave
no room for doubt.
(b) The Minority Rule
The cases most frequently cited which have taken the view that
the married women's acts make a conviction possible are Beasley v.
State,2 7 Hunt v. State 2 8 and State v. KoontZ. 29 In the Beasley case,
under circumstances involving extreme moral turpitude, the defen-
dant took from his wife money and a watch. He thereupon aban-
doned her, and after she began proceedings against him, wrote her
letters which the court found "too vulgar and indecent" to be copied
at the time these acts were passed, as a sacred social institution, and the family
as the fundamental basis of civilization.").26 182 Minn. 313, 235 N. W. 373, 374 (1931).
27 138 Ind. 552, 38 N. E. 35 (1894).
28 72 Ark. 241, 79 S. W. 769 (1904).
29 124 Kan. 216, 257 Pac. 944 (1927).
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in the opinion. Here was a case in which the defendant richly merit-
ed punishment, and perhaps this fact had some influence upon the
court. In affirming the judgment of the trial court the Supreme
Court of Indiana held that the statute endowing the wife with prop-
erty rights so completely destroyed the husband's interest that he
stood as a third person with respect to his wife's property. 0 The
court treated the marriage unity as consisting only of property rights
and gave no consideration to the fact that the immunity of the spouses
may have rested more on sound public policy than on mere rights of
property. In Hunt v. State 8 1 the Supreme Court of Arkansas re-
marked that the circumstances under which the husband obtained his
wife's money "were of the most aggravating character". The defen-
dant learned that Miss Nevills had saved $600 out of her earnings as
a saleswoman in a Little Rock, Ark., dry goods store, paid court to
her, and almost immediately after marriage set out to get the money.
Defendant induced his wife to withdraw the money from the bank and
to give it to him to invest in certain business property. On the same
day, in company with another woman, he left the city and was later
apprehended in California. There was some evidence that defendant
had planned the marriage as part of a scheme to obtain the money.
The trial judge charged in substance that if the property was secured
from the wife by fraudulent artifices the defendant should be con-
victed for "a husband in this state, may steal the property of his.
wife." 12  In affirming the conviction the Supreme Court said:
The conclusion of the whole matter is that while modern civilization has
greatly, if not entirely, relieved the personal unity of the husband and wife, and
the superior control of the husband, of the disgraceful cruelty practiced in the
early stages of the common law, yet the very letter of the law in that respect
has not undergone very marked changes, but as to property rights that unity
has been destroyed, so far as affects the question at issue, by positive enact-
ments in this state * * *3..
30 138 Ind. 552, 553, 38 N. E. 35, 36 (1894) ("Under the enabling statutes
of Indiana the husband's interest in the wife's goods and chattels is abolished,
and with its destruction the right also to fraudulently misappropriate them. In
Garrett y. State, 109 Ind. 527, 10 N. E. 570 (1887), the defendant was indicted
for burning the property of "another person", to wit, the property of Hannah
Garrett. The evidence showed that he and his wife, Hannah, the owner of the
dwelling house so destroyed, occupied, used and dwelt therein as their habita-
tion, and yet this court said: 'If a man unlawfully, feloniously, willfully, and
maliciously sets fire to and burns the dwelling house of his wife, wherein she
permits him to live with her as her husband, he is guilty of the crime of arson,
as such crime is defined in our Statute.' Arson, as defined in our statute, is an
offense against the property, as well as the possession. Larceny is also an
offense against the right of private property, and, if the husband can commit
the crime of arson against her private property, it would seem to follow as a
legal conclusion that he can also perpetrate the crime of larceny of his wife's
goods.").
33-72 Ark. 241, 79 S. W. 769 (1904).
3272 Ark. 241, 79 S. W. 769, 770 (1904).
3 Ibid.; 1 BL. CoMm.* 445 (" * * * even the disabilities, which the wife
lies under, are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit. So
[ VOL.. 16
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The same view is expressed by the Supreme Court of Kansas in
State v. Koontz.34 In this case the defendant administered sleeping
powders to her husband and when he was fast asleep departed with
his property. She was convicted of petty larceny and the decision
was affirmed upon the theory that the common law rule was not in
force for two reasons:
First, we have no common-law crimes in this state * * ; all crimes are
statutory. Second, by our constitution * * * and statutes * ** the common-law
rule of the unity of property rights of husband and wife has been abrogated.aa
In the Beasley and Hunt cases it was the husband who was convicted
upon the theory that the wife had been given complete protection of
her property by the enabling acts, but in the Koontz case the same
type of provision was held to have imposed criminal liability upon a
woman with respect to her husband's property. It is easy to see that
the rights and duties of marriage ought to be correlative, but it is
difficult to see how a law guaranteeing property rights to a woman
could be construed as creating a new and separate liability in her.
Surely it would be a surprise to the average layman to lmow that a
law which purports to give one property rights is in reality a crim-
inal statute in disguise. Perhaps this thought was what prompted
Parliament to legislate specifically on the point.
- (c) The English Rule
In England, by the common law rule a wife could not be guilty
of larceny of her husband's goods even though she were an adul-
teress.3 6 Her adultery was a significant factor in determining the
culpability of a person who assisted the wife in taldng her husband's
goods. If such person had not committed adultery with the wife
there was no larceny, but if he had he could be convicted. 37 Much
of the language in the earlier English decisions is confusing, particu-
larly a dictum of Lord Campbell in Regina v. Featherstone,38 to the
great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of England."). Prof. Dicey says
that "this splendid optimism of 1765 is too much for even the complacent
toryism of 1809, and at that date, Christian, an editor of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, feels bound to deny that the law of England has shown any special
partiality to women." He poignantly illustrates how a husband could despoil
his wife's estate and hold her in a state of virtual servitude. See DIcEY, LAW
AND OPINION IN ENGLAND (2d ed. 1914) 371 ff.
34 State v. Koontz, 124 Kan. 216, 257 Pac. 944 (1927).
35 Ibid.36 Reg. v. Kenny, 2 Q. B. D. 307, 3 Am. Cr. Rep. 448 (1877); Reg. v.
Featherstone, 6 Cox C. C. 376, 1 Dears. 369 (1854).
37 Reg v. Featherstone, supra note 36. But cf. Reg. v. Kenny, supra note
36; State v. Banks, 48 Ind. 197 (1874) ; see 15 ENG. AN EUP. DIG. § 9893.38 Reg. v. Featherstone, Supra note 36 (Campbell, C. J. "The general rule
of law is, that a wife cannot be found guilty of larceny for stealing the goods
of her husband, and that is upon the principle that the husband and wife are, in
the eye of the law, one person; but this rule is properly and reasonably qualified
1941]
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effect that when a wife commits adultery her position is altered. The
paramour and not the wife was on trial, and subsequent cases make
it clear that although the wife was an adulteress she could not be con-
victed. This dictum has no doubt provoked some confusion in this
country, as some American courts have indicated that an adulteress
might be convicted of larceny.3 9 Whatever the English law may have
been prior to 1882, a statute enacted in that year 40 dispels any doubts.
Under this enactment the stealing by the wife of the goods of her
husband, when about to leave or desert him, has been made a crime.41
The husband's liability is the same as that of the wife under this
statute.4
2
(d) New York Cases
The courts of New York have as yet done little towards clari-
fying the position of the spouse who steals the other spouse's prop-
erty with respect to responsibility to the state. Apparently the first
reported case in New York which has dealt with the question is People
when she becomes an adulteress. She thereby determines her quality of wife
and her property in her husband's goods ceases.").
39 State v. Banks, supra note 37; see 2 BisHop, Calm. LAW § 1803 et seq.;
cf. Note (1932) 12 B. U. L. REV. 283, which takes Lord Campbell's dictum
at face value and apparently reaches the conclusion that an adulterous wife
may be convicted of larceny of her husband's goods. The significance of Lord
Campbell's dictum becomes clear when the opinion of Alderson, B., in the
same case is considered, "The wife could not be convicted, so as to make the
two accomplices in the commission of the offense; but the adulterer cannot set
up as a defense the delivery by her when he takes the goods with a knowledge
of the circumstances." Lord Campbell had no intention to alter the common
law rule, and the decision was not considered to do so by either Cox or Dearsly,
the reporters.
40 Sections 12 and 16 of the Married Women's Enabling Act are repro-
duced in Section 36 of the Larceny Act, 1916, viz.:
Larceny Act, 1916 (6 & 7 GEo. V, c. 50) § 36: "A wife shall have the
same remedies and redress under this Act for the protection and security of her
own separate property as if 'such property belonged to her as a feme sole:
Provided that no proceedings under this Act shall be taken by any wife against
her husband while they are living together as to or concerning any property
claimed by her, nor while they are living apart as to or concerning any act
done by the husband while they were living together concerning property
claimed by the wife, unless such property has been wrongfully taken by the
husband when leaving or deserting or about to leave or desert his wife.
2. A wife doing an act with respect to any property of her husband, which
if done by the husband in respect to property of the wife, would make the
husband liable to criminal proceedings by the wife under this Act, shall be in
like manner liable to criminal proceedings by her husband."
41 Rex v. Creamer, 1 K. B. 564 (1919) (H. and W. are not living apart
within the meaning of the Larceny Act when H. is temporarily abroad on
military duty. Hence if W. steals H.'s property during such an absence, and
thereafter commits adultery and abandons him she is not guilty of the crime,
and her paramour who received the property also is not guilty. Here the
taking of the property preceded the adultery).
42 Lemon v. Simmons, 57 L. J. Q. B. (N.s.) 260 (1888).
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ex rel. Troare v. McClelland,43 a habeas corpus proceeding before the
Supreme Court of Albany County. The relator, Dorothy Troare, was
charged with grand larceny, first degree, in violation of Section 1294,
subdivision 2, of the Penal Law,44 for allegedly taking and carrying
away from her husband eighty dollars. The sole question raised by
the application for a writ of habeas corpus was whether or not a wife
may be guilty of larceny of her husband's property. The court stated
the common law rule and held that unless abrogated by statute it re-
mains in force. Finding no derogatory statute, the court said:
The penal statutes of this state must be strictly construed and if the
Legislature intended that one spouse could charge the other with such crime, it
should have used such language as to have left no room for doubt. The Legis-
lature had power to enact a statute that would cover a situation of the character
here presented. It evidently did not see fit so to do.45
The court found no New York case to be "precisely in point", and
quoted freely from State v. Arnold, supra, Snyder v. People, supra,
and State v. Phillips, supra. The court did not cite any cases in
sister states which have taken the other view.
The question arose next before Chief Magistrate Bromberger,
in the City Magistrate's Court of New York, Borough of Manhattan,
Seventh District, in People v. Rossiter.46 The defendant, husband of
the complainant, was charged with violation of Section 1290 of the
Penal Law,47 for alleged embezzlement of the proceeds of a check
43 146 Misc. 545, 263 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1933).
44 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1294 ("A person is guilty of grand larceny in the
first degree who steals, or unlawfully obtains or appropriates, in any manner
specified in this article: * * * 2. Property of the value of more than twenty-five
dollars, by taking the same in the night time from any dwelling-house, vessel
or railway car, * * * ").
15 146 Misc. 545, 546, 263 N. Y. Supp. 403, 405 (1933).
46 173 Misc. 268, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 30 (1940).
47 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1290, Larceny defined:
"A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his
property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the
use of the taker, or of any other person: 1. Takes from the possession of the
true owner, or of any other person; or obtains from such possession by color
or aid of fraudulent or false representation or pretense, or of any false token
or writing, or secretes, withholds, or appropriates to his own use, or that of
any person other than the true owner, any money, personal property, thing in
action, evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any kind: or, 2.
Having in his possession, custody, or control, as a bailee, servant, attorney,
agent, clerk, trustee, or officer of any person, association, or corporation, or as
a public officer, or as a person authorized by agreement, or by competent
authority, to hold or take such possession, custody, or control, any money,
property, evidence of debt or contract, article of value of any nature, or thing
in action or possession, appropriates the same to his own use, or that of any
other person other than the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof,
"Steals such property, and is guilty of larceny. Hereafter it shall not be
a defense to a prosecution for larceny, or for an attempt or for conspiracy to
commit the same, or for being accessory, thereto, that the purpose for which
the owner was induced by color or aid of fraudulent or false representation or
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given to defendant to be deposited in the bank account of defendant's
corporation for collection. At the close of complainant's direct tes-
timony defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that
as a matter of law he could not be guilty of the crime of larceny or
embezzlement of his wife's funds. This motion was denied. The
Chief Magistrate's opinion is far more analytical and scholarly than
any other opinion on this subject which the writer has encountered.
He takes into account all of the American authority on the point and
points out that "The decisions which refuse to find the common-law
rule as to larceny by a spouse abrogated by the Married Women's
Acts, consider that this unity of social relationship still exists, though
the relationship as to property status has been altered. * * * Indeed,
this is made the specific test for the decision in People ex rel. Troare
v. McClelland."48 Discussing the other view which represents the
minority rule, he says:
The authorities which favor renunciation of the common-law rule concede
that the cases thus holding ignore the fact that the common-law unity must
have consisted of more than the ownership of the wife's property by her
husband, but find justification for this lack of technical or logical unity in the
fact that "the result is more consistent with the modem view of the family,
which may well ignore a common-law principle, any possible reason for the
existence of which has long since disappeared". 4 9
In reaching the conclusion that the common law rule has been abro-
gated, the Chief Magistrate states that "the Legislature patently in-
tended a complete emancipation of married women in their property
rights", and adds:
To deny a spouse the right to prosecute the other for a crime against the
property rights thus assured, would be tantamount to imposing and judicially
enacting a limitation never intended by the legislative body. Had such restric-
tive result been contemplated as against any person, it is fair to assume the
Legislature would have expressly so provided in the various so-called emancipa-
tory acts. 50
In short, the view is taken that the courts should supplant "fic-
tional refinements" with "realism", 1 and that the "implication" of
pretense, or of any false token or writing, to part with his property or the
possession thereof was illegal, immoral or unworthy"
48 173 Misc. 268, 270, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 30, 32 (1940).
49 Ibid.
50 173 Misc. 268, 271, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 30, 33 (1940).
51 People v. Rossiter, 173 Misc. 268, 272, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 30, 34 (1940)
"A conception of law must here be established 'which realism can accept as
true'. Under the common-law doctrine there were no illusions or fictions
attaching to the unity of the being by merger of marriage. That status was
there firmly established as an actuality in every phase of legal recognition.
This conception, in present reality, has been so materially altered in such
various, and fundamental characteristics through legislative modifications and
social revisions that it has become almost illusory. Such being the modern
concept and realism, there is no sound basis for reverting to the fictional
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the husband's answerability for larceny from his wife, indicated in
People v. Decker,52 should be adopted rather than adhering to the
rule expressed in Troare v. McClelland. It is difficult, however, to
determine whether or not an implication may fairly be drawn from
the Decker case. This case has not been recognized as a leading case.
It was decided in 1911 and was never even cited in an opinion by a
New York court until that in the Rossiter case. Decker was con-
victed of grand larceny in the second degree in the County Court of
Kings County. The indictment laid the property in his wife, but no
point was made of this on appeal. The conviction was reversed on
other grounds and no mention was made of the relationship of the
defendant to the complaining witness. The fact that a new trial was
ordered could indicate that the Appellate Division believed that a hus-
band could commit larceny of his wife's goods, but it also could in-
dicate that the court did not think of the point or assumed the defense
could be and in fact had been waived. In any event, the case is of
very doubtful authority. The only other New York case in which
the point has arisen is People ex rel. Carr v. Martin, 3 in which de-
fendant was convicted of grand larceny for having stolen two rings
from his wife. Defendant, after sentence and while in prison, ap-
plied for a writ of habeas corpus. He appealed to the Appellate Divi-
sion, from an order denying his application, and the court unani-
mously reversed, sustained the writ, discharged the prisoner with $50
costs and disbursements, and said: "A husband may not be con-
victed for larceny from his wife." In support of this conclusion the
court did not cite any cases in point but relied on Caplan v. Caplan, 4
Allen v. Allen 5 and Schultz v. Schultz.5 6  The Caplan case held
that the wife could not sue a partnership in which her husband was
a member for personal injuries. In the Allen case a wife was held
unablt to sue her husband for malicious prosecution, and the Schultz
case held that a wife had no cause of action against her husband for
damages for assault and battery. The authority of this decision is
rendered even more doubtful by the fact that the doctrine of the cases
relied upon was abrogated by the 1937 amendment of Section 57 of
the Domestic Relations Law.57 Thus at the time of the decision of the
Martin case, these cases were no longer law.
refinements to re-establish an unreality and thereby to limit the reciprocal
property rights of married persons and the natural consequences flowing from
them contrary to what I deem to have been the legislative intent."
52 143 App. Div. 590, 127 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (2d Dep't 1911).
53 261 App. Div. 865, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 729 (3d Dep't 1941).
54 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23 (1927).
55 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E. 656 (1927).
56 89 N. Y. 644 (1882).
57 See note 11, supra.
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Conclusion
The position which the New York Court of Appeals will take if
this question comes before it is highly speculative. True, the Appel-
late Division of the Third Department held in the Martin case that
there could be no conviction, but the court did not write an opinion
and rested its decision on three cases which do not even contain dicta
on the point. The writer feels, however, that if the question does
reach the Court of Appeals, that court should hold in favor of the
spouse's immunity. This conclusion is not the result of a be-
lief that such a holding would greatly aid in preserving the unity of
the family, but is predicated upon the firm conviction that penal laws
should be written so that the layman can fully understand them. They
should be expressed in clear, unmistakable terms, and should not be
implied from words of doubtful meaning. Personal liberty is too
precious to be destroyed by subtleties of legal reasoning. Where the
law has become obscure because of conflicting decisions it is the duty
of the legislature to take the initiative and restate or clarify it.
ANDREW J. GRAHAM.
THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 295(L) OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE TO THE DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY
The defense of alibi is the defense 1 that at the time the crime
charged was committed the accused was at another place.2 The literal
meaning of the term alibi being "elsewhere", 3 the potency of alibi as
a defense is derived from the impossibility of the guilt of the accused,
because of physical circumstances. 4 Impossibility of the defendant's
presence in the place and at the time involved is the essential feature
of this defense 5 and any proof whose tendency it is to show that it
was reasonably impossible for the accused to have been present at the
time and place of the commission of the offense charged, is sufficient
1 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) 505 ("The defense of alibi
is not, properly speaking, a defense within any accurate meaning of the word
defense, but is a mere fact shown in rebuttal of the evidence introduced by
the State. The corpus delicti is not denied by the claim of alibi, its only design
is to prove that the defendant, being in another place at the time, could not
have committed the offense charged").
2 Dees v. State, 99 Fla. 1144, 128 So. 485 (1930); Huckett v. State, 121
Neb. 36, 237 N. W. 159 (1931).
8 Azbill v. State, 19 Ariz. 499, 172 Pac. 658 (1918).
4 Singh v. State, 35 Ariz. 432, 280 Pac. 672, 67 A. L. R. 129 (1929) ; Harris
v. State, 120 Ga. 167, 47 S. E. 520 (1923).
5 Williams v. State, 123 Ga. 138, 51 S. E. 322 (1905).
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